Comments Reopened At Coast Guard Report

Comments have been reopened without the requirement of registration.  All comments will be moderated before being published.

Bollinger given safety award

http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1847:2012jan00263&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=107

What a joke.  You purposefully design the 123s with thin steel plating to reduce cost which makes the hull weak and puts the crew and general public at risk, you lie about that to the Coast Guard, and you get a safety award?

“This award is validation of the tireless efforts by every member of the Bollinger shipbuilding team in creating a safe working environment and a safety culture that is second to none,” said Mr. Bollinger.”

I get this is a workplace safety award but come on.  As long as your workers are safe you can put your customers at risk?  The Coast Guard specifically stated that they feared a loss of life if the 123s were used in heavy seas.

Whistleblower tries to help Coast Guard with BP clean up

http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/01/24/43278.htm

Hopefully the Coast Guard sees this whistle blower as someone who is trying to help them and is able to return the favor.

———–

Updated 1/25/2012

“Lt. William D. Spoon told The Times-Picuyane that the Coast Guard hasn’t opened a formal investigation into Walter’s allegations but is concerned about them.”

http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/01/25/fired-bp-worker-says-he-was-asked-to-fake-spill-data/

(http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ex-bp-worker-claims-in-whistleblower-lawsuit-he-was-axed-for-airing-concerns-about-oil-cleanup/2012/01/25/gIQAL6RaQQ_story.html?tid=pm_national_pop)

When I posted the first set of info I didn’t comment because I didn’t see any reason to look for a pattern that might not be there.  After seeing this new article and the quote above I am going to mention my concern about a potential pattern.

My worry is that the Coast Guard leadership, especially when it involves former Commandant Admiral Allen who was in charge of the Deepwater platform efforts, tends to circle the wagons and shoot whistleblowers when the whistleblowers efforts expose the CG leadership not doing what they should have. (If they stonewalled DHS IG Skinner they surely wouldn’t hesitate is stonewalling us)

As I understand it the CG is 51% responsible for clean up and makes the call on when the clean up ends and restoration begins. That call means a LOT to BP.  If the Coast Guard was duped then all may be fine (then again ICGS duped them and is letting ICGS off the hook.). But what if the Coast Guard knew about the issues and made the decision to end the clean up anyway? In that case there might be a problem here?

Given how the Coast Guard handled ICGS and the Deepwater program, especially involving the Commandant Admiral Allen and his Chief of Staff Admiral Papp, I think that the Coast Guard not deciding to investigate yet it a bit troubling.  If you don’t investigate then you don’t find things you don’t want to find.  Now having said that they could choose to investigate, find things they don’t want to find and obstruct this whistleblower too.

Then again, as I am sure several will rightly point out, there may be a good reason they haven’t investigated, they may decide to investigate and whether they do or not that doesn’t necessarily mean there is something nefarious going on.

Time will tell

Coast Guard Continued Improvements Needed to Address Potential Barriers to Equal Employment Opportunity

From GAO.gov

What GAO Found

The USCG is making progress toward becoming a model equal employment opportunity (EEO) program, as defined by EEOC. In fiscal year 2008, the USCG established a cross-functional task force, including many divisions of Coast Guard and co-led by the Civil Rights Director and the Assistant Commandant for Human Resources, to identify EEO problems, review data, as well as develop and implement plans to address barriers to EEO. EEOC officials commended the USCG’s cross-functional approach, noting that it could strengthen the USCG’s ability to bring together different divisions of the USCG toward a common goal of identifying and eliminating barriers to EEO. According to EEOC, progress has been most noticeable with the commitment of USCG’s leadership to equality for all employees and applicants and its focus on resolving complaints in a quick and cost effective manner. However, EEOC noted that USCG could improve the way it conducts analyses of its barriers to equal employment. To attract and retain top talent, EEOC’s MD-715 states that federal agencies are to identify barriers to EEO in the workplace, execute plans to eliminate barriers, and report annually to EEOC. USCG has several initiatives to improve how it identifies and addresses possible barriers. Still, based on its MD-715 reporting, there is no evidence that the USCG is taking a structured and consistent, or systematic approach to identifying and eliminating barriers in the workplace. For example, USCG has not documented any assumptions or reasoning to support the rationale for its improvement initiatives, and it is not apparent that the initiatives are part of a larger strategy. By clearly demonstrating its efforts to identify and eliminate barriers, the USCG could improve its program, and the ability of EEOC and others to assess USCG’s progress towards becoming a model EEO program.

In response to a prior GAO recommendation, CRD developed a performance measurement plan in July 2011 to help it assess the actions it has taken to improve its provision of EEO services, including counseling and training, to USCG personnel. The plan incorporated some common practices of performance plans, such as establishing annual goals, objectives, quantifiable measures, and targets that could help CRD maintain accountability for the changes it has made to improve services. However, there are weaknesses in key areas of CRD’s performance plan, such as measures that do not consistently provide a valid representation of the performance goals. Additionally, while nearly all CRD’s measures have targets, CRD has not included baselines against which to compare goals and future performance. Further, CRD’s plan does not include credible procedures to verify and validate performance information. Refining its performance measurement plan would help address these gaps and provide reasonable assurance that CRD is achieving its intended objectives for program improvements. GAO recommends that the USCG (1) take a systematic approach in conducting barrier analyses and reporting its progress toward becoming a model EEO program and (2) refine its performance measurement plan to address gaps in key areas. DHS concurred with both GAO recommendations.

Why GAO Did This Study

In the past, allegations of management weakness and inadequate provision of civil rights services were made against the U.S. Coast Guard’s (USCG) Civil Rights Directorate (CRD). To address these allegations, in 2008, the Director of CRD commissioned an external review of CRD’s operations. As a result of recommendations made in that review, CRD has developed steps, such as reorganizing its operations, with the intent of program improvement. As requested, GAO examined (1) how the USCG’s equal employment opportunity (EEO) program compares to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) Management Directive 715 (MD-715) reporting standards for a model program, and (2) the extent to which CRD has defined performance goals and measures that are useful in assessing program improvements. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documentation from the USCG and EEOC, and literature on performance measurement. GAO also interviewed USCG, EEOC and other relevant agency officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the USCG (1) take a systematic approach in conducting barrier analyses and reporting its progress toward becoming a model EEO program and (2) refine its performance measurement plan to address gaps in key areas. DHS concurred with both GAO recommendations.

For more information, contact Yvonne D. Jones at (202) 512-6806 or jonesy@gao.gov.

Status Legend:

• In Process
• Open
• Closed – implemented
• Closed – not implemented

Recommendations for Executive Action

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to develop and implement a systematic approach in conducting barrier analyses, including defining barriers, and demonstrate this approach in MD-715 reports so that EEOC, relevant units of Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Congress can accurately assess USCG’s status in achieving model program status.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security

Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to refine its performance measurement plan, with implementation time frames, in the key areas to include: (1) ensuring measures are valid representations of performance goals, (2) including baseline measures, and (3) verifying and validating data used for the measures.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security

Status: Open

GAO called it 10 years ago – Deepwater would be a mess

Then

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2001/August/Pages/GAO_Report4215.aspx

Now

http://www.hstoday.us/focused-topics/information-technology/single-article-page/gao-coast-guard-deepwater-goals-are-unattainable/8de7c46ad0c2a9b1c165a5a646620fad.html

“This approach, even by GAO’s own admission, is innovative, but the GAO also pointed out the potential that reliance on one contractor for 20 or more years could create inflated prices, schedule delays or both.

But the Coast Guard recognizes this and has a solution. The service intends to enter into an initial five-year contract with the “systems integrator,” as the contract winner will be called. If the contractor’s performance is satisfactory, the Coast Guard plans to renew the contract, again for five years, after renegotiating prices. The contract may be renewed up to five times, giving the service a good way to hold the systems integrator accountable.

The GAO report all but throws down the gauntlet between the Coast Guard and Congress, urging the Coast Guard to develop an alternative procurement strategy and plans that will lower costs without sacrificing capability.”

The Coast Guard is considering this advice. The service must be able to adapt if it is to keep the program afloat.”

 

And the Coast Guard is still giving ICGS a pass.  There was a (fraudulent) program wide performance guaranty and it was a performance based contract with ICGS in charge as the LSI

Definition of Guaranty – A formal pledge to pay another person’s debt or to perform another person’s obligation in the case of default.

Maybe an Iranian can say “We are doing more with less” after being rescued by a 110 crew?

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/01/navy-coast-guard-cutter-rescues-iranian-mariners-011012/

Excellent example of the men and women of the Coast Guard are still doing more with less as all 49 of the 110s were supposed to be replaced by 123s in 2009. Instead of the ICGS performance guaranty taking care of this, after the 123 program was scrapped, the Coast Guard paid more to refurbish many of the 110s so they could keep all 49 in service. Mission performance has dropped 70k hours since 2005. Defensive Cutter Readiness failed and will no longer be released to the public along per the DHS IG. Deepwater cost $17B when it started and is $29B now. By the way – the men and women of the Coast Guard were actually asked to stop saying they are “doing more with less”. I guess that means if you can’t say it that it must not be true?

Project On Government Oversight comments on Deepwater’s self proclaimed demise

http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2012/01/no-more-deepwater-diving.html

New article – Has the Coast Guard learned any lessons from the Deepwater program?

http://fcw.com/articles/2012/01/05/has-the-coast-guard-learned-the-lessons-of-deepwater.aspx

While there have been some major changes I am sure they haven’t learned anything important at all. Just the opposite actually. I say that because other than some small improvements I believe the CG was pushed into every major decision and change made. If you look at the coincidence of all the major CG announcements including end the 123 program and of the ICGS contract, relative to hearings and major press stories you will see Commandant Allen was pushed into doing all of these things. Remember IG Skinner saying that he had never seen the amount of stonewalling his investigators were experiencing as those he saw from people in Allen’s command? While ICGS is the main villain here Allen sidestepped doing the right things as much as he could.

- I agree they learned the composite hulls are not a good idea yet. They were sold a bill of goods by ICGS on that one.
- They learned to pretty good C4ISR specs. I saw the one for the FRCs and it was much better
- I do not believe they learned to stop using LSIs (even though there is now a law forbidding DHS and DoD weapons program from ever using them again). They would still be using them if not for congress. In defense of the LSI concept it would work great if the company is ethical. The CG will never have the on board talent industry does. So assuming an even ethical playing field LSI concept is better. As that is not the case the government winds up having to do second best but on balance, due to the unethical behavior of industry, they do a better net job
- SoS was never the issue and is the only right way to do it. The CG saying they abandon it is either PR or they actually did it and that was dumb. All SoS says is that you do a top down design. Overall mission requirements, to asset requirements then you build the asset requirements. The design follows that pattern. It’s common sense. A bottoms up asset approach is dumb because you wind up with huge mismatches. Having said that SoS is a double edge sword. It can be much better than bottoms up but also much worse. If you blow SoS you blow it everywhere or close to it.
- They are in the process of learning that stonewalling, not telling the whole truth, and protecting themselves and ICGS can win overall. If our appeal fails and they can avoid a tragedy and more press articles and hearings they will have learned that circling the wagons and lying on top of little bits of truth and dragging things out for years can work overall.

Look at the recent decision making. The IG just reported the mission performance is going down and that the CG wants to hide some critical pieces of those measurements from the public including Cutter Defensive Readiness. The fleet is in horrible shape – worse than before Deepwater began. The contract price went from $17B to $29B for what? Even though a couple NSCs and an FRC are out they are years behind replacing ships that should have been replaced years ago and 10-15 years ago if you take the post 9/11 RAND report seriously.  Another huge issue problem is the program wide PERFORMANCE guaranty fraud we found in discovery of our 123 lawsuit against ICGS. That is currently a $9B fraud being ignored by the USCG.  ICGS said they would provide the performance guaranty and even stated in writing they “executed” and “delivered” the “unconditional” guaranty after the contract was signed. Since ICGS was an LSI and in charge of the program after the CG wrote the mission requirements they were responsible to design and deliver systems/assets that met the those CG mission performance specs. Since they didn’t the performance guaranty should have kicked in. It didn’t because it was never provided.  Ever wonder why the CG paid for several of the buckled 123s to be repaired outside of ICGS? Or why we even have to have lawsuits to get the 123 $ back? Look at the new IG report. 70k less mission hours since 2005. That is a performance problem ICGS caused. Hours were supposed to go up not down. Sooner or later that will result in a rescue or some other critical mission that goes bad because an asset DW was already supposed to replace breaks down. The CG knows all of this which is why they obstructed our case when we tried to add the guaranty fraud. They want to protect themselves by going after only Bollinger for the 123s, letting ICGS off the hook for that, while they avoid the $9B guaranty and fraudulent inducement claims.
Congress needs to look into the false guaranty issue.

Why is Coast Guards IP Address 152.121.19.252 So Angry

Editorial

This site gets a number of angry comments, more so they always originate from inside Coast Guard.  Even with the near end of Blogging on Coast Guard Civil Rights, this site still gets an incredible number of comments from inside the USCG Domain who want to keep the debate alive.  For what reason, that’s the question.  All 38 complainants have moved on, happily so on almost every case I’m aware of.  Debate is great but when it’s just to attack the messengers, it’s a waste of time that will be moderated out here.

The DeKort debate equally gets off course from within the USCG 152 Domain.  Why? Please debate the facts … like them or not and move on.  Personal attacks are again are a waste of time and serve no purpose.

Coast Guard declares Deepwater Dead

http://www.uscg.mil/servicelines/archive/20111208-Deepwater.asp

“Coast Guard to officially drop the Deepwater name from any reference to our acquisition portfolio. The active period of performance for the last line item under the Integrated Coast Guard Systems contract ends in January, and there will be no further work initiated.”
“Deepwater was an innovative idea and in line with conventional wisdom at the time. Moreover, the Coast Guard found ourselves in a position where all our surface assets were in need of recapitalization at nearly the same time, and we needed to elucidate the urgency of this problem. Deepwater was the solution.
“However, due to some well-publicized problems in execution, the Deepwater title now has negative connotations. In the end, the general consensus is that we ceded too much responsibility to the contractor, including some functions that should have been reserved for government employees. However, there is a great deal of good that has emerged from this endeavor. We have learned many hard lessons, fostered systems thinking, built our acquisition expertise and are collectively smarter as a service. Chances are good that you, the reader, have one or more acquisition certifications.”
“Failure to finish out these investments will create capability gaps in the future as other recapitalization needs become inexorably more urgent.”
———————–
What a bunch of spin all of this is. And it’s extremely unfortunate.
Ordering Deepwater to never be written or spoken again is like when they did the same when they told the men and women of the service to stop saying they were “Doing more with less”. Both are propaganda meant to stifle the truth.
The FACT is that Deepwater is only wounded and the ghost or son of Deepwater lives. And that is the problem. Yes the Coast Guard took over as the lead. But who is building those cutters? The same companies that ICGS subcontracted. Which was THEMSELVES. Who committed fraud against the government, built cutter hulls they made weak on purpose to save money and lied about the program wide performance guaranty and thereby won the contract through fraudulent inducement? The same companies – Huntington Ingalls (Northrop) and Bollinger. (Given this ICGS should never have been able to legally win Deepwater since that guaranty was a mandatory bid and contract item)
Yes stopping the LSI contract did hurt the contractors a bit. Especially when you realize it can never happen again in DHS or DoD because of a law written forbidding LSIs. That not only hurt the Deepwater contractors but everyone in the industry. But like I said at the end of the day they subcontracted themselves for the real work. Watch how the rest of the FRCs and OPCs go. (The Coast Guard gave Bollinger more FRC work after they and the DoJ sued Bollinger directly. They have evidence that Bollinger designed the 123 hulls to be weak on purpose to save $ on steel and they still gave them more work.) As far as I am concerned these companies should not be able to bid on that work until they clean up their mess. Of course that would take a courageous effort on the Coast Guard leaderships part.
I applaud the Coast Guard ending the LSI contract and taking over. But don’t think for a second that is nearly enough. The fleet is in far worse shape than before Deepwater began, the mission performance is worse and so bad the Coast Guard has been stopping the public release of reporting on some of the mission performance reporting including Cutter Defensive Readiness.
In addition to the reuse of declaring Deepwater dead the Coast Guard has been modifying its message on how bad things are. While that appears to be a good thing, like declaring you took over, it is a canard meant to keep people from seeking the truth. (The best was to con someone is to leverage some truth). The fact is the Coast Guard is smart enough to see that things are extremely bad, they have seen the reports including the recent one on mission performance and the GAO saying Deepwater cannot be successful as funded and structured, and are smartly evolving from total denial to champions of transparency, are crying victim again and putting the blame on congress for not funding them adequately. While they were surely victims until Deepwater began money was not the problem here. (The real victims here are the men and women who service in the Coast Guard and the American taxpayer) Mismanagement and the lack of courage to really hold the contractors accountable was and is the problem. The Coast Guard cries for money while they let ICGS off the 123 and false guaranty hook that could be worth over $9B. Why don’t they try and get that money by holding ICGS accountable?
That is when Deepwater will really be dead. Deepwater will be dead when everyone is held accountable, the Coast Guard is actually transparent as opposed to selectively transparent, the mission performance measures get to wheree they need to and the RAND report recommendations are satisfied to a satisfactory level. (As we know transparency breed s self corrective behavior. As such the amount of correction is directly related to the amount of transparency). The Coast Guard needs to hold ICGS etc accountable for the 123s and false guaranty (and maybe even the $835M Katrina fraud under investigation by the DoJ relative to how that relates to Deepwater). All of that would result in money to help them catch up, they would start earning people’s trust back, they would have the right plan and funding in place to provide the capability and service we all need. The reasons we had Deepwater in the first place.

Here is why they need to declare it dead.  To spin away the truth.  The fact is that the GAO and DHS IG have shown that the program is in extremely bad shape, and getting worse as is the capability of the Coast Guard to perform it’s missions. The Coast Guard wants you to believe this is a money problem not a leadership one.

http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-111_Sep11.pdf

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/20/old-coast-guard-cutters-r_n_1161268.html

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/07/coast-guard-deepwater-program-report-072911w/

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/07/coast-guard-deepwater-program-report-072911w/

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11743.pdf

Looking in to publishing a routine report on mission performance issues

The Coast Guard has been stepping up its PR in relation to publicly acknowledging the worsening condition of the fleet, the severe degradation of mission hour performance and that it is all tied to failing mission assets.  I am going to try to help them with this. The Coast Guard has lost about 70k mission hours since 2005. In this period the hours were supposed to increase dramatically due to the Deepwater program.  The Coast Guard has admitted in the latest DHS IG report (link below) that the exact opposite is happening and this is due to failing assets.(The IG also notes the Coast Guard has decreased the reporting on mission performance over the past few years. It is now 10 less. If that data wasn’t bad would they be pulling that data back? If it was a security issue why would they have ever reported on it in the first place? One of the areas is Defense Readiness of Patrol Boats.  Key information to hide if the data is dismal and getting worse)  Most of these failing assets should have been replaced by Deepwater assets by now and by extension the mission capability should be rising. (And that is just compared to the original baseline not the RAND recommended 10-15 year acceleration they suggested in their post 9/11 report).  I expected the Deepwater issues to mean things wouldn’t get better – but I did not expect things would get worse – and this much worse.  The Coast Guard has admitted that they had issues with Haitian and Deepwater platform issues because of this.  At some point if it hasn’t happened already happened (and is being covered up) there will be a loss of life because of this.  To date all the Coast Guard has done about this is complain to congress they need more money and try to lay all of this on their doorstep instead of take responsibility and do what they should and can on their own to fix this.  They not only avoid helping us do that but actually have gone out of their way on several occasion to obstruct us and our case, which is n their behalf, and protect ICGS and themselves. (That is not holding ICGS responsible for the 123s  and trying to stop us from holding ICGS accountable for the $9B X3 fraud involving the program wide guaranty and the fraudulent inducement of the whole DW program).   I am not going to let this continue.  I am going to FOIA for repair and mission records and publish, on a routine basis, how the nation is suffering because of this.  I am also going to see if member of congress are concerned about the Coast Guard cutting back on critical performance measures.  When tragedy strikes the CG, DHS IG and congress can all figure out how to cover their own posterior because of what they have done and not done. I am going to make sure I have tried everything I could to avoid the tragedy.

http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-111_Sep11.pdf (Page 4 shows the mission hours degradation, Page 5 shows it is due to asset performance, Page 30 shows Patrol Boat Defense Readiness failed and Page 7 shows the CG wants to stop reporting on that measure and has been decreasing the amount of mission performance data it is publicly reporting)