Coast Guard tiptoed into the blogging waters – only to get smacked hard
The comment Anonymous on SCIFs and the Intelligence Specialist Rating continues to generate great dialogue and once again we’re bumping a comment up as its own post. “Different Anonymous” wrote a comment that may be one of the best written and most succinct narratives on Coast Guards problems with Deepwater and its slide into social media.
Different Anonymous
Anon PA is correct on the fact that it is a Cost Plus contract. The intention was NSC1 was to be cost plus. NSC2 and after were to be fixed cost. That changed after they acknowledged there will be structural mods. NSC2 is/was still fixed, but NSC3 is Cost Plus as well. Jury is still out on NSC4 and beyond.
Does that mean the CG pays for the TEMPEST changes of C4ISR system – that I’m unsure. You would hope that you wouldn’t have to pay extra to make the system right…. but let’s reach way back in CG history here. When the 378’s were going through their midlife extension (known as FRAM) it was proven that shipyard personnel were installing equipment incorrectly, told to redo it by CG inspectors, and then charged the CG twice – once to do it wrong, once to do it right. I don’t think there is anything that nefarious going on at LM… but it has happened before.
Now as for the numerous decisions that go into accepting a ship… I will revise my statement – I believe that it was 90% political. I believe that the commissioning date and the port call in Baltimore were significant factors. There is something to be said about getting the crew on, making it a CG asset, and having the contractors play by CG rules. At the same time, the same emphasis is not being placed on accepting WAESCHE. Now, who knows, maybe the crew will drive out a perfect cutter when it’s said and done – but there will also be a large portion that will rotate having never set sail on the WAESCHE.
One clarification I would like to make… there was TEMPEST testing done on the NSC prior to acceptance, but nothing passed. The visual re-testing has occurred post-acceptance/rebuild, and that passed.
Now all of that aside – I’d like to talk about social media and the role it’s played in the Deepwater program. I guess the first place I would start, is what if this whole scenario played out 20 years earlier. If YouTube hadn’t existed, how would you have gotten the story about the 123’s out? Yes, every now and then whistleblowers got in the news, but to get national attention, the story would have to be about dumping chemicals in a river and causing kids to get cancer.
That’s the era that most of CG senior leadership grew up on. I believe the Coast Guard Academy didn’t start issuing computers to cadets until the early 90’s. Mid-level officers are comfortable with using computers, junior officers grew up with computers, and senior officers used typewriters.
Your YouTube video broke right around the time everyone started getting comfortable with using YouTube. It got a lot of visibility, and attracted media attention. On top of that, open forums like Military.com and now this blog are a way that similar people can talk about topics from across the country. You can’t just post a media statement on a blog. Anyone can google and find a conflicting statement – even if they have no inside knowledge on the topic.
CG tiptoed into the blogging waters – only to get smacked hard several times. They didn’t seem to understand the blogging world can get mean and bloggers don’t just buy everything hook, line, and sinker. I think this comes back to my thought that the CG needs to speak plainer. I hope that this is where the CG is going eventually. When I hear that PAs are told not to post on certain blogs, it certainly is upsetting. I understand that not everything is for public consumption for security reasons. I hope the CG becomes more transparent in an official manner and soon – it appears the new President is going to demand nothing less.
I think that this is truly a convergence of two big entities at once which has resulted in an unexpected result: a flawed program and the introduction of social media. Would any of this have been brought to such great attention if YouTube and blogging hadn’t existed?
It’s interesting how our discussions have come full circle – with us agreeing on almost everything now. Note to self – terminology matters.
Given the history of ICGS (especially Lockheed) I should think they want to get paid for all of this “extra” work. Given their performance during and since the 123 debacle I think they dug deep and have to dig further in to their existing strategy. If they break form at all they would wind up basically admitting culpability and ownership of those C4ISR problems – especially TEMPEST. They have never admitted that any of TEMPEST issues existed or that my allegations had merit. (Of the four issues the only one they admitted partial responsibility on was the external equipment. But that was only after they were boxed in to a corner by DHS – who also boxed the CG leadership in to a corner forcing them to ask for a complete refund in this area. That act probably drove a new design for the NSC etc – at least in this area. Wonder who paid for that?) Of course we know Lockheed rejects the refund claim and we just learned that ICGS may be going to the government for additional compensation because the CG cancelled the 123 contract. Apparently the saying that there is no better defense than playing offense is appropriate here.
Another problem here is the Coast Guard. I know I am a broken record here, but the Ron Porter ordeal matters. Allowing for improper and illegal waivers of critical TEMPEST failures on the 123s did two things. It gave the CG something they had to cover up and it told Lockheed those designs, and designs like them, are acceptable. I don’t see how this turns around until someone comes out and reverses all of that. Lockheed has the Coast Guard by the shorthairs – a position the CG allowed themselves to be put in. If, as you state, the CG is turning things around relative to TEMPEST, and I do note that you said the visual tests passed, I am not sure they can get all the way through and pass the instrumented tests. I say this for two reasons. One is that it appears Lockheed didn’t own up to their part in the C4ISR TEMPEST design and didn’t act until several years after they were supposed to. This could have severely impacted the final design of the ship itself. Second, I don’t see Lockheed doing something different than they did on the 123s unless the CG gives them air cover – and they risk exposing themselves and their previous errors. Why would Lockheed change anything that was accepted – especially through a “waiver”? Very interesting and tenuous dynamic. Said differently – the CG may have simply turned the corner way too late and to not a large enough degree for it to matter enough now. (Factor in three other factors. There are ongoing DoJ and DHS IG investigations, there is a new administration and the lawsuits are starting to fly. Sure seems like an environment to circle the wagons in not make changes and risk exposure) In order for Lockheed to make changes it seems to me some kind of deal had to be made. Maybe the CG allowed Lockheed to generate and ECP. Basically that would mean the CG asked for a change or addition in design. That would give Lockheed relief. If that’s the case I would imagine Lockheed asked for a lot more money. The CG leadership pays attention to these threads and chimes in on occasion to explain, counter or defend something I have said. Maybe they will clear this one up?
Again I am not sure if it was wrong to accept the ship. As it is a huge bargaining chip maybe it was. (Having said that there are huge costs and downsides for delaying further). My basic problem with acceptance is the lack of transparency and accountability. Were the huge design, installation and test holes covered on the DD-250? Was there a huge $ holdback? (I realize the CG released the DD-250 but they did not release the associated documentation that broke the codes of the open items. All you can tell from the DD-250 is that there are areas with open items listed and the items are enumerated.) Additionally the CG went way out of its way, on several occasions, to misrepresent the status of the TEMPEST systems. Very close to testing and there is no big problem is nowhere near the apparent fact that there was no design, no equipment and no shot for testing for quite a long time. That isn’t a nuanced position by the CG it is a misrepresentation.
I also you noticed that there was TEMPEST testing before acceptance but nothing passed? How did they do that? Is this the crux or the “equipment removal” issue? (Regardless of who did the removing)? Did they bring some stuff on only to take it back off after it failed? Now I am not going as far as to say that they removed it because it failed. That allegation may be incorrect. It very well could have been incremental testing. However – it still shows us how far off they really were from their public statements.
As for passing visual testing. That is good – if they didn’t gundeck it. The 123s failed miserably in this area. Of course the real test is the instrumental testing. Wonder how much transparency we will get on all of this?
I concur with your comments on the blog and the CG being caught behind the power curve. While that could very well be a function of a new culture I think it’s something else. No matter what the new information methodology it can be very tough to use if you don’t really want to put out the truth or all of the information. The internet just makes that a much harder thing to avoid doing – or at least to escape notice or criticism for not doing.
You are more than on the money when you ask where would we be without the internet, YouTube etc. There were many events that happened along the way that were very fortuitous for me and the fact that I was able to capitalize was more luck than anything else. The YouTube thing was a very fortunate event and one I certainly didn’t count on happening when I tried it. There were a lot of things that proved to be very helpful to me (one being the DHS IG getting involved well before YouTube) however it is very possible that I would not have gotten nearly this far if it were not for the internet. Forget the exposure for a second – it would have been very hard to communicate with some people and organizations and to get data. I would have to have been a microfiche hound and that would have taken forever if I could have done it at all. Hopefully this whole event will be a case study for many things – one being how government and corporate entities should handle the age of the internet when they seek to avoid, misrepresent and spin. Maybe someone will write a book on it someday? Wonder what the final chapter says?
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/01/22/social.networking.news/index.html
Read this article after I posted. It seems our president can use Twitter to disseminate information about ongoing conflicts between Israel and Palestine to the public. According to some sites, other DHS agencies can use Twitter as well – counter to what is being claimed by RADM Glenn a few posts below. Unfortunately CG-6’s policies run counter with trying to engage in the social media world, and now CGDN cannot connect to Twitter (among other sites). It seems the CG is taking a few steps back – behind everyone else in the government. Long road ahead… It’s going to take some really progressive leadership in making this technology work for the Coast Guard or a decade or so for new blood to filter in…
I couldn’t agree with you more. Especially about the progressive leadership or new blood. I think you will have to hope for the latter. The current leadership team, in spite of their forceful and seemingly forthright support for being progressive and transparent, really doesn’t want to let those wagons leave the tight circle they are in. Problem is that the more transparent they are they more more transparent those around and below them are. I should think that your involvement in these blogs over the past couple weeks has thrown them in to quite a tizzy. I would imagine it set back that transparency significantly. You are blogging and doing so in an atmosphere where it is not really embraced. Imagine how many people would show up and blog if it was. Imagine what else we could learn.
I wish it wouldn’t send people up in arms, but have them look at their practices with a more critical eye. The blogging world shouldn’t be scary, perhaps it’s the accountability and answering the hard questions directly that is. The one encouraging thing I have seen this week is the D1 PAO responding directly to CG Blog about the Patriot case today. He explained the whole story, and did it in simple and straight forward terms. Cleared up any sense that the Coast Guard was doing something wrong in this case – which was the overwhelming public opinion. He informed the public about CG policy on underwater photography – and why that was an unusual request. I hope this trend keeps up.
I hope the trend keeps up as well.
Maybe there are changes coming, after the innauguration, that some feel it might be too hard to fight. Sometimes morphing works – sometimes it doesn’t. The issue has always been the degree, quantity and validity of the transparency. If someone decides to come clean, with that much baggage, can they do so and survive the light that shines on their own wrong doing? Or do they try to fulfill something less than the requisite transparency to shine that light on everyone except themselves? Can they get away with that?
There is no way the Commandant and his staff can be fully transparent without admitting their own sins or others dropping the dime in return. Having said that people can be quite understanding and surprisingly forgiving – especially when someone in power finally faces their demons and does the right thing. When compared to the sins of the contractor, the sins of the Coast Guard leadership is much more forgivable.
Michael,
I’m glad to see that your misunderstanding of what a SCIF actually is has been cleared up. I still don’t think you have clearly accepted the NSC TEMPEST time line. from my first hand experience and direct conversations with those present before me (at the deck plates) I can lay out for you a clear path for the TEMPEST process:
WMSL crew identified serious concerns with shipboard systems (EMO was a prior TEMPEST inspector)
CG-9, 6, and 8 accepted concerns
CG-9 confronted LMCO which started theur was not contractual obligation for systems to be compliant with TEMPEST standards (it is important to understand that the Navy has thissame problem with LMCO. Their solution is to just accept the ship and fix it themselves since its cheaper).
LMCO accepted responsibility to fix system but CG had to pay for it.
Ship failed visual inspection (at shipyard in early ‘08)
LMCO began rearhitecture of systems (this lead to serious degradation of some sytems to allow for compliance (Air search radar and security cameras for example) which have still not been resolved but are TEMPEST compliant)
Some of these reworkings within the ship required numerous computer cabinets to be removed (WAESCHE and STRATTON racks were designed to be with standards and installed on BERTHOLF. Noncompliant racks were then redesigned to be compliant and installed in WAESCHE). This may have been what kicked off the thought that systems were removed to pass INSURV. this inspection is to safety only and has nothing to do with TEMPEST. C4I installs and removals may have been going on concurrently (spring ‘08, ship still in yards, not yet accepted).
CG signs DD-250 for WMSL 750 (C4I still not TEMPEST compliant and over 5,000 INSURV violations noted). DD-250 listed all TEMPEST and INSURV concerns. This resulted in a CONDITIONAL acceptance of Hull 1. NGSS/LMCO still liable/responsible for addressing all DD-250 concerns prior to full acceptance of the ship.
NSC still under constraints from DD-250 and Warranty period. LMCO/NGSS are still onboard fixing the issues noted.
Full acceptance of the ship still pends.
The CG really had no choice but to accept the ship and move forward. No real work was happening on the ship at the yards. On average only two dozens workers were onboard each day doing the work. There really was no impetus on their part to fix/finish the ship. Every day the ship remained at the yard was more money the CG was paying, not just on that hull but on all future hulss since it gets figured into the fixed cost on future hulls. It wasn’t until the CG accepted the ship that the crew coud actually start managing the work onboard, supervising the quality of the work, inspecting the results, and removing workers the were literally hiding around the ship and sleeping.
The BERTHOLF is now on the west coast and managing all of the remaining issues through MLC, ELC, and ship’s force oversight. Instead of being forced to watch worthless workers drag their feet they can now contract to competent contractors and complete the work on time, within budget, and at a proper quality level. I would venture that more work has been done on the ship since departure from MS than was done in its last year at the yard. In the yard there was rarely more than 30 works on board. In Alameda an average of 70 workers have been onboard six days a week plus ship’s force, NESU, MLC, and othe CG members. Even with the ship under way half of the time more is getting done since contractors are sailing with the ship to address issues and working on the ship during port calls.
With regards to TEMPEST, the day of reckoning is coming. Within the next five months the work, and hopefully final instrument inspection will be done and awaiting final approval. We all, including yourself should hope it goes well. I’d like nothing better than to put this issue to bed and focus instead on all the rest of the problems NGSS and LMCO left us with.
Original anonymous
Thanks for the info
-The issue was not that I didn’t know the definition of a SCIF. (I worked with them in DoD and State.) The issue was the use of them. The information I receive suggests the SCIFs were used in spaces that had lower than SCI classification due to design issues with the interior spaces of the ship. Given the recent information that Lockheed did not provide a timely and complete C4ISR design in order to design and fab the ship as is normally done the scenario makes sense and seems quite plausible.
-I see you corroborate Lockheed’s unwillingness, at least for quite a long time, to do the TEMPEST work they signed up for. Interesting that LM would try to get way with that. They wrote a spec with not only TEMPEST requirements in it (though not complete or current) but the spec called out all of the systems with secure voice and data and specifically called out crypto models. When they tried the argument with me and Joe Michel, the CG’s C4IS engineer for the 123s, we argued you can’t have one without the other. They acquiesced to some degree but not nearly enough. They would not order shielded cables and so much had been bought and installed without the proper design that the problems were abundant. Hence the illegal Porter waivers. (Another case of Lockheed blowing the bid?)
-It appears you are conforming that LM took responsibility but only after seeking additional funding – which they got.
-Serious collateral system degradation? Air search radar and cameras? (Blind spots – again). What are the exact degradations? What requirements would fail as a result? What is the solution? Fix, waive, and change the specs?
-I understand the information relative to the equipment being removed. There’s always some truth to most “rumors” isn’t there?
- 5000 Insurv violations? TEMPEST visual and instrumented violations? Or broader than just that? Any that still require major redesigns of the systems or the ship? Any that seem undoable or would affect the mission – like the radar and cameras mentioned?
- Understand you points about getting the ship accepted. I still have a problem with the way it was documented and the immense amount of misinformation coming out of the CG and contractors
- You say that others are being contracted to fix the ship now. Is that additional money to pay for work to get done right, rework or cases where the workers who get paid simply don’t do it?
- If that ship was designed and built without a lot of C4ISR/TEMEPST data odds are there are problems that cannot be fixed, assuming standards and requirements are not lowered. More “waivers” to come?
-Let’s say the CG covers it’s own and the contractors butts, the taxpayers pay for something basically twice, but the ship is fine (not lowered standards etc like the radar and cameras – especially not lower security standards). How is that a good thing overall? With no transparency and no accountability there is no deterrent. Without a deterrent these kinds of things will happen again. The CG and ICGS will have basically provided a “best practices” scenario for how to get away with things like this.
- Different Anon – do you concur with all of this info?