GAO FRC decision proves Coast Guard lied to congress and the DHS IG – and other interesting information

by Michael DeKort

Item – CG and ICGS lied to congress – Self-certification

“The agency also noted, in reviewing Bollinger’s performance on the 123-Foot WPB program, that “[t]he 123-Foot WPB Delivery Task Order required self certification of the design and build standards during contract performance as opposed to the traditional role of the government performing Quality Assurance,”. . .

“In this regard, the agency evaluators, in detailing the differences between the 123-Foot WPB program and the FRC-B, noted, among other things, that the “FRC-B imposes strict limitations on the extent of modifications to the parent craft,” and that, as opposed to the self-certification process used in the 123-Foot WPB program, the FRC-B contract requires that the contractor “obtain [an] ABS Classification Certificate to HSNC rules.”

Comment

The GAO very clearly states that ICGS/Bollinger did self-certify.  The CG, Adm Allen and Adm Blore I believe, both are on record denying there was nay self-certification going on.

Item – MMC design – environmental problems – why so important now?

“As mentioned previously, the SSA agreed that the practical effect of MMC’s proposal’s failure here would “place[] Coast Guard personnel at risk when operating in cold conditions where icing could be encountered”

“The agency points out here that the angle of heel of MMC’s proposed FRC-B under the topside icing criterion exceeds the requirement set forth in the solicitation by approximately 18 percent, and concludes that in its view, “[a]n 18 [percent] increase in heel with an ice covered deck will certainly place Coast Guard men and women at greater risk.”

“In this regard, the protester points to two e-mails written by the contracting officer, in one of which the contracting officer stated, while referring to MMC’s proposed FRC-B, that “I’m not willing to put my neck out for a boat we know will sink today,” and another that indicated the issue was “will the boat float or sink.”

Comment

I find it interesting that the Coast Guard is now paying so much attention to environmental issues.  Where were they when almost all of the equipment Lockheed supplied for the topside C4ISR equipment was proven to not meet environmental specs?  Those equipments were part of the 123, OPC, FRC and NSC comm, nav and sensor systems. Failure in these systems in the worst of conditions could have been catastrophic. When my allegations first came out the CG stated they were baseless.  Of course the DHS IG and congress said otherwise.  After that the CG very quietly asked ICGS for a complete refund for these items while never telling the public that the allegations were dead on. So they were willing to put the crews of all the 123s, FRCs, OPCs and NSCs at risk before – but not now?  (And these are mostly the same people)

Item – Center of Gravity (KG) – selective competency

“The agency determined that MMC had applied an element to be used in the required calculations–the KG margin12–incorrectly in both its initial proposal and FPR, and that the correction of this error, as calculated by the agency, “uncovered existing stability problems with the MMC proposed FRC-B.”

“In this regard, the agency advised MMC that the “KG margin for the proposed FRC-B has been incorrectly calculated,” provided the bases for this conclusion, and stated that the agency’s analysis of the information in the proposal indicated that MMC’s proposed FRC-B failed to meet a number of intact stability requirements, including the intact stability requirements related to “topside icing.”

Comment

So now everyone is competent when it comes to the center of gravity?  They can figure out that there were design issues relative to MMC’s prop in the area of center of gravity yet no one, to this day, knows where the 123 hull extension effort went wrong and why 8 boats had to be built before they even knew they had a problem?  Funny how the CG is so selectively competent.  Remember their own engineers said the NSC had hull longevity issues and the 110s should not be extended due to center of gravity and other issues.  Both of these predictions were made well before the ships were built.

So if everyone understand ship design and the center of gravity issues so completely now – maybe someone can tell us how the 123 design went so wrong and who is responsible?

Common Causes for Coast Guard Acquisition Performance Problems – Where are the root causes?

by Michael DeKort

The data below is from the Coast Guard’s Blueprint for Acquisition Reform

• Inadequate definition, understanding and/or stability of requirements
• Lack of acquisition expertise in program management
• Inability to effectively manage a systems integrator
• Inability to adequately assess programmatic risk
• Lack of expertise in cost estimation
• Suboptimal contract strategy formulation
• Inconsistent resources due to yearly vice multi-year funding
• Inadequate senior level strategic program management and oversight
• Lack of continuity in key management positions
• Lack of knowledge management and decision support systems

(Here’s the kicker)

“These shortcomings are common throughout government and commercial systems acquisition to varying degrees.”

So the problems are purely mechanical and everyone else in the government pretty much does the same thing. So why should we have expected any more from them?  Hell it looks like mere mortals can’t be expected to do much better. If the Coast Guard only had the right system in place none of the problems would have happened.  (By the way most of the other government programs in trouble don’t follow the LSI model and are doing pretty much everything the CG is evolving to now.  So it’s no panacea)

While I agree that most of these mechanical changes will help NONE of them solves the root cause and NONE of them would have avoided the majority of the problems if they were in place before the troubles began.

The root cause is PEOPLE and how they perform.  People in positions of leadership who don’t do the right thing.  These are leadership and ethical fortitude issues.  The leadership in the CG knew about all of these problems well before any deliveries were made and in a lot of cases well before designs were complete.  Yes the contractors shafted the hell out of the CG and put them is a spot they shouldn’t have been put in.  But when they did find themselves in that spot the CG leadership rolled over and in doing so made the problems worse and perpetuated them.  And they still are.  Go look at other programs across DoD that are in trouble.  They adopted all the mechanical stuff in the CG Acquisition for Reform DECADES ago.  If that was truly the fix you wouldn’t have any problems on DoD projects.

That list is nothing more than a cop out. The real answer is accountability and transparency.  Get it all out there, hold people accountable and do so publicly.  Obviously these people don’t have the political courage to do the right thing on their own so apparently we to scare it in to them.  It’s pretty much how most organizations need to be dealt with – commercial or governmental when they screw up.

There is nothing in that list that has to do with the quality and performance of the individuals themselves.  There is a leadership vacuum and it needs to be filled.  The fact that the CG leadership can’t even admit that and add those items to the list demonstrates the point.  They don’t even have the political courage to be transparent about their own shortcomings as leaders.