What’s Happening with Cadets at Coast Guard Academy

GAO Report Slams Coast Guard – Sen Cantwell Takes on Commandant

From the hearing

Sen Cantwell asked the Commandant if there were any contracts that operated outside of the MSAM (procurement guidelines) and he said no. Then she raised the new GAO report (below) and said the GAO mentioned the FRC was done outside of the MSAM (as I stated above). The Commandant had no answer.- because he got caught – and needed to have the GAO rep next to him bail him out.

Sen Cantwell also asked about the SCIF. The Commandant said it was never planned for the NSC and was added after 9/11. When the Senator asked why the design for it was started so late the Commandant said the spaces were reserved and all they have to do is add equipment. It’s a shame she didn’t press him further. This is a massive oversimplification. Those spaces have to be very specially designed and can’t be near things like cabling, A/C ducts etc. I am told the reason the SCIF is not done is because there was a major interior redesign which is nowhere near complete and that the CG agreed to add the SCIF to fund Lockheed for the other C4ISR work it said it was not contractually obligated to do. See below for more on this)

Also – Cantwell asked why the parent craft for the FRCs is $10m and the boat the CG bought is $50m (remember Marinette protested because theirs was cheaper among other things). The Commandant said it was shipyard issues and electronics. Cantwell didn’t buy it

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There was a new GAO report out this week on the CG’s management of Deepwater

Highlights – From the report

“However, the Coast Guard has not applied the disciplined acquisition process to the FRC and the second increment of C4ISR, recent contract actions that will involve additional investments of taxpayer dollars over time. “

So – how was the FRC bid process fair and professional? There was enough there for the GAO and CG to refute Marinette’s challenge – especially they had the cheaper bid? (Plus the ABS says the FRC parent craft’s hull may not be strong enough). It also says the second increment of C4ISR was not done in a disciplined way. Well either was the first increment. So what will they fall back on – system of systems – and repeat the same problems.
They said use of subs in program management and engineering roles has gone up. Who supplies them? Lockheed? Northrop? L-3 (Lockheed)?
“Finally, in light of the sheer size and scope of the Deepwater Program and Congress’s role in providing funds, the Coast Guard’s budget submissions do not provide a complete picture of the planned costs of Deepwater assets that would help inform the decision-making process. “
Why would congress allow this?

Also there is a major increase of funding for C4ISR? Was this to pay Lockheed off? The CG paid for the SCIF under this. I was told that was a way to pay LM to do the TEMPEST work on the NSC that LM was refusing to do because they said it was out of scope on the 123s. (The specs clearly say it is in scope. Remember the DHS IG auditor told me the DHS IG got this wrong in their 123 report when they sided with LM) In order to get LM working on the NSC, very late in the program, the CG had to pay them and change scope to get them to do the work they were always signed up to do. If they didn’t pay – no NSC and LM might out the CG for their part in the cover up.

Coast Guard Profile in Service

GAO Highlights on Coast Guard Report GAO-09-682

The Coast Guard has assumed the role of systems integrator for the overall Deepwater Program by reducing the scope of the work on contract with ICGS and assigning these functions to Coast Guard stakeholders. As part of its systems integration responsibilities, the Coast Guard has undertaken a fundamental reassessment of the capabilities, number, and mix of assets it needs and expects to complete this analysis by the summer of 2009. At the individual Deepwater asset level, the Coast Guard has improved and begun to apply the disciplined management process contained in its Major Systems Acquisition Manual (MSAM),but did not meet its goal of complete adherence to this process for all Deepwater assets by the end of March 2009. For example, key acquisition management activities—such as operational requirements documents and test plans—are not in place for assets with contracts or orders recently awarded (such as the Fast Response Cutter and C4ISR) or in production, placing the Coast Guard at risk of cost growth or schedule slips. In addition, the MSAM does not appear to be consistent with recent DHS policy that requires entities responsible for operational testing to be independent of the system’s users.

Due in part to the Coast Guard’s increased insight into what it is buying, the anticipated cost, schedules, and capabilities of many Deepwater assets have changed since the $24.2 billion baseline was established in 2007. Coast Guard officials have stated that this baseline reflected not a traditional cost estimate, but rather the anticipated contract costs as determined by ICGS. As the Coast Guard has developed its own cost baselines for some assets, it has become apparent that some of these assets it is procuring will likely cost more than anticipated—up to $2.7 billion more based on information to date. This represents approximately 39 percent cost growth for the assets with revised cost estimates. As more cost baselines are developed and approved, further cost growth is likely. Updated baselines also indicate that schedules have slipped for several of the assets. In addition, the current structure of the Coast Guard’s budget submission to Congress does not include details at the asset level, such as estimates of total costs and total numbers to be procured, as do those of the Department of Defense, which acquires similar systems.

One reason the Coast Guard hired a contractor as a systems integrator was because it recognized that it lacked the experience and depth in workforce to manage the acquisition internally. The Coast Guard acknowledges that it still faces challenges in hiring and retaining qualified acquisition personnel and that this situation poses a risk to the successful execution of its acquisition programs. According to human capital officials in the acquisition directorate, as of April 2009, the acquisition branch had 16 percent of positions unfilled, including key jobs such as contracting officers and systems engineers.Even as it attempts to fill its current vacancies, the Coast Guard plans to increase the size of its acquisition workforce significantly; the fiscal year 2010 budget request includes funding for 100 new acquisition workforce positions. In the meantime, the Coast Guard has been increasing its use of support contractors.

At this Moment – DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Policy Advisor

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) Policy Advisor Debbie Fulmer is delivering remarks on preparedness efforts for special needs populations at the 2009 Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), in San Diego, Calif.

At this Moment – Secretary Napolitano before the Senate

Secretary Napolitano is testifying before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs about PASS ID.

As Deepwater Systems Integrator, Coast Guard Is Reassessing Costs and Capabilities but Lags in Applying Its Disciplined Acquisition Approach

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) gave its latest report the title we used as our headline for this post.  Admiral Thad Allen has seized control from Integrated Coast Guard Systems, but his acquisition program has a long way to go, and is not getting there fast enough.

The GAO says it did this most recent study after a series of project failures, the Coast Guard announced in April 2007 that it would take over the lead role, with future work on individual assets bid competitively, and a program baseline of $24.2 billion was set. In June 2008, GAO reported on the Coast Guard’s progress and made several recommendations, which the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have addressed.

What GAO found was that as of March 2009, Coast Guard had improved and begun to apply the disciplined management processes contained in its Major Systems Acquisition Manual (MSAM), but that they did not meet thier own goals of complete adherence to this process for all Deepwater assets.

For example, key acquisition management activities—such as operational requirements documents and test plans—are not in place for assets with contracts or orders recently awarded (such as the Fast Response Cutter and C4ISR) or in production, placing the Coast Guard at risk of cost growth or schedule slips. In addition, the MSAM does not appear to be consistent with recent DHS policy that requires entities responsible for operational testing to be independent of the system’s users.

GAO recommends that the Coast Guard bring certain assets into compliance with its acquisition processes before exercising additional contract options, consult with DHS regarding an apparent inconsistency between their acquisition policies, and better present asset costs to Congress in its budget submissions. In written comments, the Coast Guard agreed with the first two items; DHS stated that it will take the third under advisement.

The Answers to How Well Do You Know Your Coast Guard Leaders

The answers from our leadership brain teaser, How Well Do You Know Your Coast Guard Leaders:

1. “The men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard stationed in Kuwait work courageously every day to promote security in the Middle East and defuse threats before they reach our nation’s shores.”
   • Janet Napolitano
2. “As a humorous addition to the story … Admiral Allen knew the facts from a different point of view. The “stalker” was one of his seamen on the GALLATIN!”
   • Skip Bowen
3. “With a direct line of communication available to members, there will always be a tension between the traditional chain of command and the need to be responsive to members.”
   • Thad Allen
4. “By my mere presence, you know this is important.”
   • Thad Allen