Communication and Cooperation are no Substitute for Command and Control – The Civilianization of the U.S. Coast Guard
The Field Mission Support Delivery Integration Team (iTeam) being led by CAPT Timothy Heitsch the Logistics Directorate (CG-44), are meeting New Orleans today. The iTeam (you have to love the names they keep coming up with), is working with 5 other teams on how to make a modernized Coast Guard work, and move to the next level.
Admiral Thad Allen currently has dozens upon dozens of employees and contractors devoted to making modernization work. The coast in terms of active duty, civilians and contractors is in the millions of dollars. The costs continue to rise at a time President Obama is asking American’s to tighten up their belts. Allen’s rush to modernization has left his Coast Guard fractured and adrift. The split up of the former Integrated Support Commands (ISC) created 14 Base Support Units with Commanding Officers but without Executive Officers. Allen created new spin-off commands such as Personnel Services Support Units that operate without Executive Officers, but have a span of control equal to that of an Officer in Charge.
One PSSU Commanding Officer has created his own command hierarchy outside of what was presented, briefed and negotiated with the Unions.
Jeff Orner suggested at the first meeting of the iTeam last month that they needed better “communications and cooperation,” at the field level to make this work. At the end of the day “Communication and Cooperation are no substitute for Command and Control.”
Modernization 2.0: Evolving Mission Support
Guest Post by Coast Guard Chief of Staff, VADM John Currier.
Coast Guard Mission Support has undergone substantial changes in the past year, but our work is not yet complete. I refer to our current mission support structure, which was just implemented in the field on 27 September 2009, as Modernization Version 1.0. Effort focused primarily on establishing five Service and Logistics Centers and the Asset Project Office (APO) to support the Coast Guard Logistics Business Model. The recent changes were a realignment of our organization intended to prepare the field to receive support through product lines. The command and control design for local delivery of that support has not been adequately developed, so I have commissioned an analysis, which when complete, will lead to a defined construct for service delivery to the field level.
Now fully established, the new Service and Logistics Centers are squarely focused on establishing product support under a standardized business model with assistance from the APO. Each center will initialize at least one product line in the next year. Currently the APO and the Surface Forces Logistics Center are introducing the Patrol Boat Product Line (PBPL), which includes the 87′ Coastal Patrol Boat (WPB), the 110′ Patrol Boat (WPB), and Fast Response Cutter (FRC). The 87′ WPB re-baselining effort is well underway. A pilot was successfully implemented at Group Port Angeles last week. The FRC, one of the first new acquisitions expected to be delivered since modernizing, will be provided in accordance with our new CG business model. 35% of small boats and 35% of Sectors are now operating under the Coast Guard Logistics Business Model. We anticipate reaching 100% of small boats at Sectors and subordinate units by the end of calendar year 2010.
Mission Support Modernization 2.0 is now working to build an efficient operating structure that creates a stronger partnership between sector logistics and other field support units previously attached to the Maintenance and Logistics Commands (MLCs). Additionally, this next phase will continue to establish a peer relationship between the support community and our operational partners.
People at all levels and across the organization are participating in discussions relating to how we can continue to evolve mission support?s operational model. I especially appreciate the open discussions on iCommandant, our Mission Support blog, and elsewhere about these changes. This input is guiding the actions we?re taking now and those that will frame our future strategies. Approximately one hundred people in the support and operational communities are coming together on seven new integration study teams, what we call iTeams. Charted by me personally, they are studying ways to better integrate the support community with operations and will provide input that helps define our mission support operating model.
From a field support perspective, the most notable iTeam is the Field Mission Support Delivery Integration Team (iTeam) being led by CAPT Timothy Heitsch of our Logistics Directorate (CG-44). This iTeam will propose the most effective and efficient field support structure considering sector logistics and major asset logistics — areas not studied extensively during the Version 1.0 review. The iTeam is reviewing the structure and roles of logistics support elements below the Logistics and Service Center, including the Sector Logistics Department. The other six iTeams are studying mission support Headquarters functions, including communications, integration, resources, security, and the role/staffing of the APO.
Multiple options will be evaluated, except for one — we will not halt our positive momentum. Sector logistics personnel and the aviation community attest that this business model works. It will enhance mission support readiness and execution. Through this change, we will forge a better Coast Guard. Our mission support business processes will formalize the effective and consistent delivery of services at all levels of the organization.
If the current structure appears immature, it’s because we’re not done. Change itself is not the goal. We must become a Coast Guard that constantly looks for ways to deliver better mission support by increasing accountability, lowering risk, and increasing operational effectiveness. We need All Hands on task everyday to achieve this objective.
Change isn’t easy. Improvement is what we’re after. I appreciate everyone’s patience, and especially their passion for supporting our operational partners. I expect that all of you will assume a positive leadership role in implementing Modernization.
As we transform the way we do business, clear direction and open communication will ensure success throughout this evolution. The mission support Service and Logistics Centers and their field units are encouraged to foster open conversations with their peers in the operational community. People also can submit ideas or questions to AskMissionSupport@USCG.mil. We want the input of our workforce and invite participation by our union partners and other stakeholders to collectively build a better Coast Guard.
Thank you for your continued support of Modernization and for your dedication to help ensure we meet our call to be “Always Ready.”
Semper Paratus!
John P. Currier, VADM
Chief of Staff, United States Coast Guard
From the cheap seats I can attest that our friends at the BSD and SILC don’t really get it. I compare what we’re seeing at the Unit level with what you would expect if you made Seaman Timmy the Commandant for a day.
Unrealistic decisions based on assumptions from the “if I were in charge” play book.
From the deck plates… the Coast Guard created a Rube Goldberg machine out of our modernization efforts. We are simply to Byzantine, dysfunctional and petty to make it work. It will take years to unfrig this cluster. The best we can hope for is to reach our pre-modernization level of dysfunctionality in four or five years. The next Commandant has her work cut out for her.
The Heretic (above) states the problem very well. The amount of effort, manpower (and woman power) that Admiral Allen devoted to this poorly devised program called “modernization” is staggering. The planning effort was a huge distraction from conducting day-to-day business throughout most of 2007 and all of 2008. Modernization’s apparent “appeal” to our hyper-pedigreed and credentialed senior leaders is its pseudo business model characteristics…featuring fancy sounding concepts like “product line managers” and “enterprise wide solutions.” It’s the nebulous business-speak of the theoretical, untested, and recently minted MBA. And it’s nauseating. The deckplates WILL make this work. Not BECAUSE of modernization….but DESPITE the damned thing.
Insider, I agree, especially with your last two sentences.
The first red flag for me is that we decided to pursue modernization full force during an election year in which there was definitely going to be a change in Administration and without Congressional authorization. Are we really that politically tone deaf?
The second red flag was that this was supposed to be a “resource neutral” transition, which means staffing and funding do not follow responsibilities.
Lastly, all anyone had to do was look at the process maps/swim lanes to see that there are too many offices/divisions/departments involved in pieces of projects and decisions. This led to an inefficient and confused Chain of Command and no accountability whatsoever.
I’ll also second the enormous time and money sink that went into planning OPCOM/FORCECOM. Only to do it all over again for Interim OPCOM/FORCECOM. Only to do it a third time for “Numbered” PAC/FORCECOM/LANT/OPCOM, or whatever it is they are called today.
“We are simply to Byzantine, dysfunctional and petty to make it work. It will take years to unfrig this cluster.”
This appears to me to be the most accurate description of the state of the organization I’ve seen. ‘A’ Modernization effort could have worked well if the organization tended to this cultural reality first. Sadly, this is likely only a possibility if (1) the organizational leadership recognizes it and (2) the organization commits to adjusting this (I’d guess that this could take a decade or more to purge) before trying to make adjustments to business structures.
We moved too fast and ignored the underlying cultural elements that will ultimately undermine ANY substantive change.
The Byzantine Empire or Eastern Roman Empire, was the Roman Empire during the Middle Ages, centered on the capital of Constantinople, and ruled by Emperors. It was called the Roman Empire by its inhabitants and its neighbours, and was also known as Romania (Greek: Ῥωμανία, Rhōmanía). As the distinction between “Roman Empire” and “Byzantine Empire” is purely a modern convention, it is not possible to assign a date of separation, but an important point is the Emperor Constantine I’s transfer of the capital from Nicomedia (in Anatolia) to Byzantium on the Bosphorus, which became Constantinople (alternatively “New Rome”).[n 1]
The Empire remained one of the most powerful economic, cultural, and military forces in Europe, despite setbacks and territorial losses, especially during the Roman–Persian and Byzantine–Arab Wars. The Empire recovered during the Macedonian dynasty, rising again to become the pre-eminent power in the Eastern Mediterranean by the late 10th century. After 1071 however, much of Asia Minor, the Empire’s heartland, was lost to the Seljuk Turks. The Komnenian restoration regained some ground and briefly re-established dominance in the 12th century, but declined again under their successors. The Empire received a mortal blow in 1204 by the Fourth Crusade, when it was dissolved and divided into competing Byzantine Greek and Latin realms. Despite the eventual recovery of Constantinople and re-establishment of the Empire in 1261, under the Palaiologan emperors, successive civil wars in the 14th century further sapped the Empire’s strength. Most of its remaining territory was lost in the Byzantine–Ottoman Wars, culminating in the Fall of Constantinople and its remaining territories to the Muslim Ottoman Turks in the 15th century.
From Wikipedia